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DEFRAGMENTING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW TO
PROTECT CITIZEN-CONSUMERS:
THE ROLE OF AMICI CURIAE AND PUBLIC INTEREST GROUPS
ABSTRACT
Investment arbitration decisions are often inconsistent. In particular, complaints
about the unpredictability of NAFTA Chapter 11 jurisprudence and the
difficulties  in  balancing  foreign  investors’  interest  and  public  policy are common
and unresolved. An examination of the role of interest groups may shed important
light on the resolution of that problem as they are involved in the social
construction of the meaning and use of NAFTA Chapter 11 through arbitration
and public debate. This work discusses the extent to which amici curiae empower
public interest groups that seek to protect citizen-consumers. It argues that
currently amici curiae provides an extremely narrow list of participation rights to
public interest groups that, coupled with economic and political disadvantages in
many cases, result in censoring the views of such groups and playing the political
role of symbolic accountability. This work proposes an expansive view of amici
curiae for public interest groups in light of the potential of the latter to counter the
influence corporate interest groups and to contribute to both minimize NAFTA
Chapter 11 inconsistencies and strike a more realistic balance between the public
interest   and   foreign   investors’   interest. The overall impact of such expansive
amici curiae will probably be the defragmentation of NAFTA Chapter 11, that is
to say, public interest groups will be empowered to introduce public interest
considerations such as human rights, environmental protection and public health
into NAFTA analysis, that are likely to protect the interest of local citizenconsumers. However, that requires not only greater legal powers for public
interest groups, but also favorable financial and political conditions for an
effective participation of public interest groups in NAFTA disputes. The
argument is illustrated with a brief discussion of amici curiae in the context of
anti-smoking groups and tobacco policies in Canada affecting particularly
vulnerable groups with high rates of tobacco consumption such as aboriginal
communities and low-income groups.

INTRODUCTION
There is a growing concern about the inconsistencies of investment arbitration decisions
in the context of economic globalization. NAFTA Chapter 11 jurisprudence is not an
exception. After almost 20 years of NAFTA, the loopholes and uncertainties associated
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with the interpretation of, for example, the regulatory expropriation provisions have
grown despite the multiple calls for consistency and legitimacy. The resolution of the
inconsistencies and unpredictability associated with the application of NAFTA Chapter
11   and   the   difficulties   in   balancing   foreign   investors’   interest and public policy is,
however, not to be found solely in a self-referential reinterpretation of NAFTA
provisions. Placing NAFTA Chapter 11 in context is likely to shed more light into
finding solutions to the problems of legal inconsistencies and lack of proper balancing
between trade and the public interest. Embedding NAFTA Chapter 11 provisions in the
broader institutional environment suggests the need for recognizing, inter alia, the role of
interest groups in the social construction of the meaning and use of NAFTA provisions
through arbitration and public debate. For instance, the idea of public purpose and
proportionality of a measure can be socially constructed and interest groups can develop
several regulatory expropriation discourses to suit their interests, which may ultimately
influence investment tribunals and regulatory decisions by governments and shape public
opinion about the ideas of legitimate policies.

An interest group approach to NAFTA Chapter 11 analysis reveals the presence of
competing interest groups in the development of investment arbitration. Corporate and
public interest groups are central actors in such a process. In particular, given the
influential role of corporate groups, an assessment of the ability of public interest groups
to balance the influence of foreign investors in the context of NAFTA Chapter 11 appears
to be critical. While the development and role of public interest groups depend on
multiple social, economic and political factors, NAFTA rules can help promote a
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significant role of such groups and then contribute to a better balancing of the interest of
foreign investors and the public. Specifically, non-disputing party participation rights or
amici curiae are an important institution that mediates in the competition of multiple
interest groups that seek to influence the meaning and use of NAFTA Chapter 11.

This work discusses the extent to which amici curiae empower public interest groups that
seek to protect citizen-consumers. It argues that currently amici curiae provide an
extremely narrow list of participation rights to public interest groups that, coupled with
economic and political disadvantages in many cases, result in both censoring the views of
such groups and playing the political role of symbolic accountability. This work proposes
an expansive view of amici curiae for public interest groups in light of the potential of
the latter to counter the influence corporate interest groups and to contribute to both
minimize NAFTA Chapter 11 inconsistencies and strike a more realistic balance between
the  public  interest   and  foreign  investors’  interest.   The  overall  impact   of  such  expansive  
amici curiae will probably be the defragmentation of NAFTA Chapter 11, that is to say,
public interest groups will be empowered to introduce public interest considerations such
as human rights, environmental protection and public health into NAFTA analysis that
are likely to protect the interest of local citizen-consumers. However, that requires not
only greater legal powers for public interest groups, but also favorable financial and
political conditions for an effective participation of public interest groups in NAFTA
disputes. The argument is illustrated with a brief discussion of amici curiae in the context
of anti-smoking groups and tobacco policies in Canada affecting particularly vulnerable
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groups with high rates of tobacco consumption such as aboriginal communities and lowincome groups.

This article is organized as follows. It first reviews the current state of amici curiae under
NAFTA and raises concerns about the limited participation rights that are accorded to
public interest groups. The next section argues that an expansive view of amici curiae for
public interest groups is warranted in light of its advantages for minimizing the
inconsistencies of NAFTA Chapter 11 and better  balancing  foreign  investors’ interest and
public policy. The last section discusses the example of anti-smoking groups in Canada
and the relevance of an expansive view of amici curiae particularly for public interest
groups seeking to protect vulnerable groups with high rates of tobacco consumption.

AMICI CURIAE AND THE LIMITED LEGAL POWER OF PUBLIC INTEREST
GROUPS

Participation rights for non-disputing parties are one important mechanism that can
encourage a greater role of public interest groups. This may entail a redesign of the
NAFTA rules of the amici curiae institution. In Methanex Corp. v. United States, a 2001
decision on amicus curiae,1 a tribunal proclaimed its powers to accept amicus
submissions in investment arbitration for the first time2 on the basis of its interpretation

1

Methanex Corp. v. United States, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as
“Amici  
Curiae”  
(NAFTA  
Arb.,  
Jan.  
15,  
2001),  
http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/Methanex/MethanexDecisionReAuthorityAmicus.pdf
[hereinafter Methanex, Amici Curiae Decision]
2
Other NAFTA tribunals have also allowed amicus curiae in arbitration. See United Parcel Serv. of Am.,
Inc. v. Canada, Decision on Petitions for Intervention and Participation as Amici Curiae, (NAFTA Arb.
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of article 15(1) of the UNCITRAL Rules, which is substantially similar to Article 44 of
the ICSID Convention3. According to the 2003 Statement of the Free Trade Commission
on Non-disputing Party Participation, the NAFTA agreement does not limit “a
Tribunal’s  discretion  to  accept  written  submissions  from  a  person  or  entity  that  is  not  a
disputing   party   (a   “non-disputing   party”)”4. In the Statement, the FTC recommends
Tribunals to adopt a number of procedural rules concerning non-disputing party
participation. While this is an important progress in the right direction, several of such
recommendations restrict the ability of non-disputing parties to exert a significant
influence on arbitration decisions and public debate more generally. These restrictions to
the submissions of amici curiae include a short page limit, no obligation on the Tribunal
to consider that submission, lack of permission for further submissions and no access to
documents:
3. The submission filed by a non-disputing party will:
(b) be concise, and in no case longer than 20 typed pages, including any
appendices;
…
9. The granting of leave to file a non-disputing party submission does not require
the Tribunal to address that submission at any point in the arbitration. The
granting of leave to file a non-disputing party submission does not entitle the nondisputing party that filed the submission to make further submissions in the
arbitration.

2001), paras.  63,  64,  66  (“…articles 1128 and 1133 of NAFTA do not preclude the existence of a power
under article 15(1) [of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules] to allow a third party to make amicus
submissions.  …”) and  73  (“The  Tribunal  declares  that  it  has  power  to accept written amicus briefs from the
Petitioners”),  
http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Canada/UPS/UPSDecisionReParticipationAmiciCuriae.pdf.; Glamis
Gold Ltd. v. United States, Decision on Application and Submission by Quechan Indian Nation, (NAFTA
Arb., September 16, 2005), pars. 13, http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/Glamis/Glamis-AmicusDecision--16-09-05.pdf
3
Aguas Argentinas, S.A., Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A., and Vivendi Universal S.A.
v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Order in Response to a Petition for Transparency and
Participation as Amicus Curiae (May 19, 2005), para. 14 (noting that similarity),
http://juris.prod.advomatic.com/files/free_pdfs/Suez%20v%20Argentina%20-Response%20Amicus.pdf.
4
Statement of the Free Trade Commission on Non-disputing Party Participation
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10. Access to documents by non-disputing parties that file applications under
these  procedures  will  be  governed  by  the  FTC’s  Note  of  July  31,  2001.5
It is also important to note that in Methanex Corp. v. United States, Decision on amicus
curiae,6 the tribunal, while admitting non-disputing parties7, rejected their request to
attend oral hearings of the arbitration.8 Non-NAFTA tribunals have also rejected requests
to attend oral hearings.9 Likewise, the Methanex tribunal  also  indicated  that  “[a]s    amici
have no rights under Chapter 11 of NAFTA to receive any materials generated within the
arbitration (or indeed any rights at all), they are to be treated by the Tribunal as any other
members  of  the  public.”10 More generally, the tribunal stated that:
… in  the  Tribunal’s  view, its receipt of written submissions from a person other
than the Disputing Parties is not equivalent to adding that person as a party to the
arbitration. The rights of the Disputing Parties in the arbitration and the limited
rights of a Non-Disputing Party under Article 1128 of NAFTA are not thereby
acquired by such a third person. Their rights, both procedural and substantive,
remain juridically exactly the same before and after receipt of such submissions;
and the third person acquires no rights at all. The legal nature of the arbitration
remains wholly unchanged.11

5

Statement of the Free Trade Commission on Non-disputing Party Participation.
Methanex Corp. v. United States, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as
“Amici  
Curiae”  
(NAFTA  
Arb.,  
Jan.  
15,  
2001),  
http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/Methanex/MethanexDecisionReAuthorityAmicus.pdf
[hereinafter Methanex, Amici Curiae Decision]
7
Par. 53 (the Petitions for amicus curiae submissions were accepted by the Tribunal subject to procedural
limitations)
8
Par. 42 and 47  (“The  Tribunal  also  concludes  that  it  has  no  power  to  accept  the  Petitioners’  requests  to  
receive  materials  generated  within  the  arbitration  or  to  attend  oral  hearings  of  the  arbitration.”).  
9
See e.g. Biwater Gauff, Ltd. v. Tanzania, ICSID (World Bank) Case No. ARB/05/22, Procedural Order
No 5 (February 2, 2007), para. 71  (“…Claimant  objects  to  the  presence  of  the  Petitioners  at  the   hearing.  
The   Arbitral   tribunal   therefore   has   no   power   to   permit   the   Petitioners’   presence   or   participation   at   the  
hearing,  and  must  accordingly  reject  its  application  in  this  regard”); Aguas Argentinas, S.A., Suez, Sociedad
General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A., and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/19, Order in Response to a Petition for Transparency and Participation as Amicus Curiae (May 19,
2005),   para.   33   (“…the   Tribunal   has   unanimously   decided   to:   …deny   Petitioners’   request   to   attend the
hearings   of   this   case”), http://juris.prod.advomatic.com/files/free_pdfs/Suez%20v%20Argentina%20Response%20Amicus.pdf.
10
Par. 46 and 47.
11
Par. 30.
6
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That narrow view of amici curiae as set out in the FTC Statement and Methanex has been
upheld by more recent decisions. In Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States,12 the NAFTA
tribunal, dismissing regulatory expropriation and fair and equitable treatment claims,
dealt with several amicus curiae submissions by the National Mining Association, the
Quechan Indian Nation, Sierra Club and Earthworks, and Friends of the Earth.
Confirming its earlier decision to accept each submission,13 the tribunal reinforced the
restrictions on non-disputing parties recommended in the FTC Statement as follows:
… The Tribunal expressed its view that it should apply strictly the requirements
specified in the FTC Statement, for example restrictions as to length or limitations
as to the matters to be addressed, but that, given the public and remedial purposes
of non-disputing submissions, leave to file and acceptance of submissions should
be granted liberally. ... In accepting each submission, the Tribunal noted Section
(B)(9) of the FTC Statement, which states that acceptance of a non-disputing
submission does not require the Tribunal to consider that submission at any point
in the arbitration, nor does it entitle the non-disputing party to make any further
submissions. Finally, the Tribunal expressed its intent to ensure that the
incorporation of any submission, or parts thereof, would not unduly burden the
Parties or delay the proceedings.14
Clearly, those limitations of the participation rights of amici are in themselves
problematic. But even such a modest list of participation rights may not materialize at all
for non-disputing parties seeking to participate in arbitration. Upon a request for amicus
curiae status, tribunals can deny it as they have the power and discretion, but not the

12

Award (NAFTA Arb., June 8, 2009), http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/Glamis/Glamis-USAAward.pdf.
13
On February 15, 2007, the Tribunal issued its decisions on the non-disputing party applications to file
submissions in separate letters to each of the mentioned groups. The Tribunal decided to accept each
submission. See para. 286.
14
Para. 286. See also Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States, Decision on Application and Submission by
Quechan Indian Nation (Sept. 16, 2005), paras. 10-15 (following the FTC Statement, the granting of leave
to file amicus curiae submissions do not require the Tribunal to address the submission at any point in the
arbitration, nor does it entitle a non-disputing party to make further submissions).
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duty, to allow amicus curiae.15 Even if tribunals do allow amicus curiae submissions,
they can further restrict the participation rights of non-disputing parties. The tribunal in
United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Canada asserted:
…The power of the Tribunal to permit amicus submissions is not to be used in a
way which is unduly burdensome for the parties or which unnecessarily
complicates the Tribunal process. The Tribunal envisages that it will place limits
on the submissions to be made in writing in terms for instance of the length. The
third parties would not have the opportunity to call witnesses …with the result
that the disputing parties would not face the need to cross-examine them or call
contradictory evidence. …16
The submissions are to relate to issues raised by the disputing parties and cannot
introduce new issues in the litigation or go beyond the scope of the case as
defined by the disputing parties.17
…The  Tribunal  does  not  expect that it will give leave to file submissions which
are longer than twenty pages (including schedules).18
Thus, amici curiae currently offer a narrow list of legal rights to non-disputing parties to
participate in NAFTA arbitrations. These legal limitations become even more
problematic when such a narrow view of amici curiae is applied in the context of
unorganized, financially weak or politically disadvantaged public interest groups.
Ultimately, this may result in both censoring the views of such groups and playing the
political role of symbolic accountability of investment arbitrations.

15

United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Canada, Decision on Petitions for Intervention and Participation as
Amici Curiae, (NAFTA Arb. 2001), paras. 63 and 64 (tribunals have the power -but no duty- to receive
third party submissions),
http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Canada/UPS/UPSDecisionReParticipationAmiciCuriae.pdf.
16
United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Canada, Decision on Petitions for Intervention and Participation as
Amici Curiae, (NAFTA Arb. 2001), para.  69.  See  also  para.  73  (“The  Tribunal  declares that it has power to
accept written amicus briefs from the Petitioners. It will consider receiving them at the merits stage of the
arbitration following consultation with the parties, exercising its discretion in the way indicated in this
decision…”).   For   further   details   on   such   restrictions,   see   United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Canada,
Direction of the Tribunal on the Participation of Amici Curiae, (NAFTA Arb., August 1, 2003), par. 3
(“The   Order   is   limited   to   written   briefs.   It   does   not   extend   to   the   adducing   of   evidence…”),  
http://naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Canada/UPS/UPSFurtherOrderReAmicusSubs.pdf
17
United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Canada, Direction of the Tribunal on the Participation of Amici
Curiae, (NAFTA Arb., August 1, 2003), par. 5.
18
United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Canada, Direction of the Tribunal on the Participation of Amici
Curiae, (NAFTA Arb., August 1, 2003), par. 8.
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TOWARDS AN EXPANSIVE VIEW OF AMICI CURIAE FOR PUBLIC
INTEREST GROUPS
It is therefore important to consider relaxing such restrictions and assigning more
participation rights to non-disputing parties particularly public interest groups that
advocate the protection of, for instance, public health such as anti-smoking citizenconsumer groups. The proper defense of public health from the position of amicus may
require a pleading of more than 20 pages, submissions of scientific evidence and access
to the records in order to respond to the parties’  evidence  and  claims.  Such non-disputing
parties should thus have the right to make longer written submissions such as in recent
decisions between 30 and 50 pages19 as well as further written submissions and other
evidence;20 access to the evidentiary record and the  disputing  parties’  submissions;21 and
the right to attend hearings and make oral submissions. In fact, most non-disputing

19

See e.g. Biwater Gauff, Ltd. v. Tanzania, ICSID (World Bank) Case No. ARB/05/22, Procedural Order
No 5 (February 2, 2007), para. 60 (accepting a request of several groups for an amicus curiae participation,
the  Tribunal  stated  that  “…the  Petitioners,  jointly,  should  file  a  single,  initial   written  submission,  …,  but  
limited to a maximum of 50 pages (double-spaced)….”),  
http://juris.prod.advomatic.com/files/free_pdfs/Biwater%20v%20Tanzania%20%20Procedural%20Order%20No.%205.pdf; Epaminontas Triantafilou, A More Expansive Role for Amici
Curiae
in
Investment
Arbitration?,
KLUWER
ARB.
BLOG
(May
11,
2009),
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2009/05/11/a-more-expansive-role-foramici-curiae-in-investmentarbitration/.
20
Tribunals have considered requesting further submissions from non-disputing parties. See e.g. Biwater
Gauff, Ltd. v. Tanzania, ICSID (World Bank) Case No. ARB/05/22, Procedural Order No 5 (February 2,
2007), para. 72   (“…the   Arbitral   Tribunal   reserves   the   right   to   ask   the   Petitioners specific questions in
relation to their written submission, and to request the filing of further written submissions and/or
documents  or  other  evidence,  …”).
21
Some tribunals have considered the possibility of allowing non-disputing parties to have access to
documents filed by parties. See e.g. Biwater Gauff, Ltd. v. Tanzania, ICSID (World Bank) Case No.
ARB/05/22 (2007), Procedural Order No 5, para. 66   (“…Once   the April hearing has been concluded,
however, the concerns with respect to procedural integrity may be altered, and if so, there may then be less
impediment to the disclosure of documents to non-disputing  parties.  …”),
http://juris.prod.advomatic.com/files/free_pdfs/Biwater%20v%20Tanzania%20%20Procedural%20Order%20No.%205.pdf.
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parties have requested a similar list of participation rights in several NAFTA cases in
which they were granted amicus curiae status.22 This expansive non-disputing party
participation becomes even more important for improving the consistency and public
accountability   of   the   NAFTA   tribunal’s decisions in light of the fact that Chapter 11
tribunals’ decisions are not subject to judicial review on their merits.23

The value of such expansive non-disputing party participation is not limited to improving
the decisions of tribunals and, more generally, the transparency and the legitimacy of
NAFTA arbitration mechanism, as most scholars argue.24 It also serves to legally
empower public interest groups to balance the influence of foreign investors on domestic

22

See Methanex Corp. v. United States, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions from Third Persons to
Intervene  as  “Amici  Curiae”  (NAFTA  Arb.,  Jan.  15,  2001),  paras.  5  and  7,  
http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/Methanex/MethanexDecisionReAuthorityAmicus.pdf
[hereinafter Methanex, Amici Curiae Decision]; United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Canada, Decision on
Petitions for Intervention and Participation as Amici Curiae, (NAFTA Arb., October 17, 2001), par. 4,
http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Canada/UPS/UPSDecisionReParticipation
AmiciCuriae.pdf; Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States, Award (NAFTA Arb., June 8, 2009), para. 290
(various non-disputing parties requested access to the hearing and the Tribunal invited the Quechan to view
the proceedings from a different location), http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/Glamis/GlamisUSA-Award.pdf; see also documents in which the request for access to the hearings was made: Letter to
the Tribunal from Earthjustice (Apr. 25, 2007); Letter to the Tribunal from Courtney Ann Coyle, Esq. (June
26, 2007) (requesting the ability of the Quechan to view all aspects of the proceedings so as to monitor the
protection of tribal cultural resources confidentiality).
23
NAFTA, arts. 201 T 2, 1136 6. Although domestic courts are not allowed to review tribunals' application
of the law, they can only set aside NAFTA tribunal decisions that went beyond the scope of its jurisdiction.
See Mexico v. Metalclad Corp., [2001] 89 B.C.L.R.3d 359, 2001 BCSC 664 IT 67, 99 (Can.) (to the British
Columbia Supreme Court, acting as the appeal court, the issue was "whether the Tribunal made decisions
on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration by deciding upon matters outside Chapter
11"); see also INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, PRIVATE
RIGHTS, PUBLIC PROBLEMS: A GUIDE TO NAFTA's CONTROVERSIAL CHAPTER ON
INVESTOR RIGHTS 41 (2001), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/tradecitizensguide.pdf, Julie
Soloway, NAFTA's Chapter 11: Investor Protection, Integration, and the Public Interest, in
SUSTAINABILITY, CIVIL SOCIETY AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, at 137, 140 ("[A]
domestic court will not be entitled to review a decision on its merits, but rather, it may only rule on the
much narrower legal question of whether the tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction in any way.").
24
See generally e.g. Barnali Choudhury, Recapturing Public Power: Is Investment Arbitration's
Engagement of the Public Interest Contributing to the Democratic Deficit?, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 775, 809 (2008) (“transparency   through   public   access   to   the   investment   arbitration   process   or  
involvement   of   amici   curiae   on   public   interest   issues   …adds   to   the   credibility   of   this   decision   making  
process  and  helps  to  legitimize  the  process  in  the  eyes  of  the  public.”)
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policy-making in and beyond arbitration. In particular, public interest groups will be in a
better position to contribute to the determination of the public purpose and the
proportionality of government measures and offset the over-influence of the corporate
discourse.

Past attempts by public interest groups to influence NAFTA arbitrations, even under a
narrow approach to amici curiae, show the potential of non-disputing party participation.
In Methanex Corp. v. United States, Decision on amicus curiae,25 the tribunal dealt with
petitions by the International Institute for Sustainable Development, Communities for a
Better Environment, the Bluewater Network of Earth Island Institute and the Center for
International Environmental Law, requesting to appear as amici curiae on the basis of the
immense public importance of the case. The   Institute   also   contended   that   “the  
interpretation of Chapter 11 of NAFTA should reflect legal principles underlying the
concept of sustainable development; and that the Institute could assist the Tribunal in this
respect”.26 Furthermore,  the  Institute  argued  that  “there  was  an  increased  urgency in the
need for amicus participation   in   the   light   of   the   award   …   in   Metalclad Corporation v.
United Mexican States and an alleged failure to consider environmental and sustainable
development   goals   in   that   NAFTA   arbitration.”27 The Methanex tribunal, accepting the
petitions and even adopting a narrow view of amicus curiae,28 recognized the relevance

25

Methanex Corp. v. United States, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene
as  
“Amici  
Curiae”  
(NAFTA  
Arb.,  
Jan.  
15,  
2001),  
http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/Methanex/MethanexDecisionReAuthorityAmicus.pdf
[hereinafter Methanex, Amici Curiae Decision]
26
Par. 5.
27
Par. 6
28
Par. 53.
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of allowing such groups to participate in a Chapter 11 arbitration in which the public
interest was at stake:
There is an undoubted public interest in this arbitration. The substantive issues
extend far beyond those raised by the usual transnational arbitration between
private parties. This is not merely because one of the disputing parties is a State
…   The   public   interest   in   this   arbitration   arises   from   its   subject   matter,   as  
powerfully suggested in the Petitions. There is also a broader argument, as
suggested by the [United States] and Canada: the Chapter 11 arbitral process
could benefit from being perceived as more open or transparent, or conversely be
harmed if seen as unduly secretive. In   this   regard,   the   Tribunal’s   willingness   to  
receive amicus submissions might support the process in general and this
arbitration in particular, whereas a blanket refusal could do positive harm.29
Interestingly, departing from Metalclad and deciding on the main issue, the Methanex
tribunal held the view that the public purpose behind the regulatory measure was
paramount and trumped all, making the regulation a lawful one and thus permitted under
NAFTA.30 The public purpose was decisive, finding no expropriation and no obligation
to compensate.31

Similarly, in United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Canada, decision on amicus curiae,32 the
Canadian Union of Postal Workers and the Council of Canadians, seeking expansive
amicus curiae rights, contended that there was a public interest in that arbitration and

29

Methanex Corp. v. United States, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene
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par.  
49,  
http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/Methanex/MethanexDecisionReAuthorityAmicus.pdf
[hereinafter Methanex, Amici Curiae Decision]. This reasoning has been followed by non-NAFTA
tribunals. See e.g. Biwater Gauff, Ltd. v. Tanzania, ICSID (World Bank) Case No. ARB/05/22, Procedural
Order No 5 (February 2, 2007), para. 51.
30
Methanex Corp. v. United States, 44 I.L.M. 1345, pt IV, 15 (NAFTA/UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. 2005).
31
Id.
32
United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Canada, Decision on Petitions for Intervention and Participation as
Amici Curiae, (NAFTA Arb., October 17, 2001),
http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Canada/UPS/UPSDecisionReParticipationAmiciCuriae.pdf.
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they have real interest in adding a perspective that clearly departs from the view of
foreign investors:
…the claim raises issues of broad public interest which extend well beyond postal
services to other public and social services. Further, the expansive interpretation
of NAFTA urged by the Investor would dramatically expand the scope for foreign
investor claims and put at risk a broad diversity of government measures that
should not be vulnerable to such claims. …   They say that they are uniquely
qualified to contribute a perspective on these matters of broader public interest, a
perspective which would otherwise be absent.33
Non-NAFTA tribunals have also allowed amicus curiae participation by public interest
groups34 because of their potential contribution to improve the tribunal decisions on
matters affecting the public interest, human rights and consumers rights. For example, in
Aguas Argentinas, S.A., Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A., and
Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentina,35 five non-governmental organizations requested
amicus curiae participation, namely Asociación Civil por la Igualdad y la Justicia (ACIJ),
Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales (CELS), Center for International Environmental
Law (CIEL), Consumidores Libres Cooperativa Ltda. de Provisión de Servicios de
Acción Comunitaria, and Unión de Usuarios y Consumidores. The Aguas Argentinas
tribunal noted that the public interest warranted allowing NGOs to participate as amicus
and recognized that non-parties can provide a perspective that can help decide a matter
that will affect millions of citizens-consumers and will also have an impact on human
rights:
33

Par. 14.
See e.g. V. Vadi, Critical Comparisons: The Role of Comparative Law in Investment Treaty Arbitration,
Denv.   J.   Int'l   L.   &   Pol'y,   (2010)   (“Increasingly, investment arbitration tribunals have allowed public
interest  groups  to  present  amicus  curiae  briefs  or  have  access  to  the  arbitral  process.  …”),  V.  Vadi,  Cultural
Diversity Disputes and The Judicial Function in International Investment Law, Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com.,
(2011) (noting the same).
35
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Order in Response to a Petition for Transparency and Participation as
Amicus Curiae (May 19, 2005)
34
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…The factor that gives this case particular public interest is that the investment
dispute centers around the water distribution and sewage systems of a large
metropolitan area, the city of Buenos Aires and surrounding municipalities. Those
systems provide basic public services to millions of people and as a result may
raise a variety of complex public and international law questions, including
human rights considerations. Any decision rendered in this case, whether in favor
of the Claimants or the Respondent, has the potential to affect the operation of
those systems and thereby the public they serve.
These factors lead the Tribunal to conclude that this case does involve matters of
public interest of such a nature that have traditionally led courts and other
tribunals to receive amicus submissions from suitable nonparties. …
Given the public interest in the subject matter of this case, it is possible that
appropriate nonparties may be able to afford the Tribunal perspectives,
arguments, and expertise that will help it arrive at a correct decision. …36
Similarly, in Biwater Gauff, Ltd. v. Tanzania,37 five petitioners filed a petition for amicus
curiae status:   the   Lawyers’   Environmental   Action   Team,   the   Legal   and Human Rights
Centre, the Tanzania Gender Networking Programme, the Center for International
Environmental Law and the International Institute for Sustainable Development.38 The
Petitioners stated that the privatization at issue in that arbitration was conceived to work
towards the goal of halving the proportion of people who are unable to reach or to afford
safe drinking water as committed by the international community in the UN Millennium
Declaration.39 They  further  claimed  that  the  arbitration  “has  a  substantial influence on the
population’s   ability   to   enjoy   basic   human   rights.”40 Allowing the petitioners to make
limited amicus submissions,41 the   tribunal   envisaged   “that   the   Petitioners   will   address  

36

Ibid. paras. 19-21.
ICSID (World Bank) Case No. ARB/05/22 (2007), Procedural Order No 5, paras. 1, 55,
http://juris.prod.advomatic.com/files/free_pdfs/Biwater%20v%20Tanzania%20%20Procedural%20Order%20No.%205.pdf.
38
Ibid. para. 1.
39
Ibid. para. 13.
40
Ibid. para. 14.
41
For example, the Tribunal rejected their request to attend oral hearings and open access to documents
was not granted.
37
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broad policy issues concerning sustainable development, environment, human rights and
governmental  policy”.42

Public interest groups can also help establish the proportionality of a measure. For
instance, public pressure by public interest groups may be an important consideration in
legally legitimizing bona fide, non-discriminatory regulatory measures for pressing
public purposes. “In Tecmed, the tribunal reasoned that the social and political
circumstances that surround a regulatory decision are also important factors in assessing
the proportionality of the measure and establishing unlawful expropriation. In particular,
the tribunal suggest that an otherwise expropriatory regulation will not be categorized as
expropriation where it is implemented in proportional response to a serious urgent
situation or social emergency.”43

A regulatory response and an urgent situation or social emergency are to some extent
socially constructed and interest groups play an important role in both constructing such a
situation or emergency and pressing for a regulatory response. Thus, the presence or
absence of active interest groups is likely to determine the NAFTA legitimacy of a
regulatory action as they are involved in the social construction of the response and the
urgent situation or social emergency. It follows that, in the case of tobacco regulation and
with an expansive amicus curiae, public interest groups advocating appropriate measures
to reduce extremely high levels of tobacco consumption among, for example, aboriginal
communities may be in a stronger position to demonstrate the urgency of the situation
42

Ibid. para. 64.
Alberto Salazar V., “NAFTA  Chapter  11,  Regulatory  Expropriation  and  Domestic  Counter-Advertising
Law”  (2010)  27  Arizona  Journal  of  International  and  Comparative  Law  31 at 80.
43
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and disseminate information about the proportionality and public purpose of a measure in
and outside an arbitration.

Furthermore, expansive non-disputing party participation will reduce the chilling effect
of foreign investors’  use  of  NAFTA  Chapter  11  suits.  Public  interest  groups  empowered  
with greater participation rights can be perceived as strong advocates of public health
before, during and after an arbitration, which may discourage excessive threat of NAFTA
lawsuits by foreign investors. This will create an institutional environment that favors a
more balanced use of NAFTA Chapter 11 in which public policy and the interest of
investors are better balanced even without reaching arbitration.

Moreover, an expansive non-disputing party participation is likely to induce the growth
and the greater engagement of public interest groups with investment arbitrations and
public debate as spheres of promoting public policy. Such groups may be encouraged by
an expansive amicus curiae to seek more participation in arbitration cases as they may
feel that their views can be communicated more effectively and be influential. The
possibility that amici curiae can increase the participation of public interest groups is
real. In fact, that was the fear of Methanex Corporation that raised that concern to oppose
the granting of a (narrow) amicus curiae status to several public interest groups in
Methanex.44 Such increased participation of public interest groups in arbitration will in
turn incentivize them to further engage in domestic policy-making and challenge the
44

See Methanex Corp. v. United States, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions from Third Persons to
Intervene  as  “Amici  Curiae”  (NAFTA  Arb.,  Jan.  15,  2001),  par.  14  (“…An  undesirable  precedent  would  be  
set and other groups might be encouraged to seek to appear as amici in arbitrations under Chapter 11 of
NAFTA”),http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/Methanex/MethanexDecisionReAuthorityAmicus.p
df [hereinafter Methanex, Amici Curiae Decision]
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influence of corporate groups. From this perspective, amici curiae turn out to be an
important legal institution that mediates in the broader competition between interest
groups involved in public policy-making under the pressures of economic globalization.
Needless to say, such impact of an expansive amici not only will help fix the democratic
deficit of NAFTA but also contribute to improve the democratic nature of domestic law
and policy making.

The overall impact of such expansive view of amici curiae will probably be the
defragmentation of NAFTA Chapter 11, that is to say, public interest groups will be
empowered to introduce public interest considerations such as human rights,
environmental protection and public health into NAFTA analysis that are likely to protect
the interest of local citizen-consumers. However, the effectiveness of an expansive
amicus curiae requires not only greater legal powers for public interest groups. It also
needs to pay attention to the financial and political conditions that will favor an effective
participation of public interest groups in NAFTA disputes.

AMICI CURIAE IN CONTEXT: TOBACCO REGULATION AND COMPETING
INTEREST GROUPS IN CANADA

The role of public interest groups in the development of tobacco control policies in
Canada provides an interesting example of the significance of the social context of amici
curiae in NAFTA disputes. In particular, a close examination of the attempts to introduce
plain packaging legislation in Canada and the role of competing interest groups reveals
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that unfavorable financial and political conditions may hinder the ability of public interest
groups to participate in NAFTA disputes and policy-making more generally.

There is some evidence that the tobacco industry has been engaging in several strategies
to influence the meaning of NAFTA expropriation provisions and the perception and
beliefs associated with what constitutes a NAFTA-based legitimate tobacco control
measure, as part of their broader strategies to influence tobacco consumption and its
regulation in society. In “May  10,  1994. Carla Hills (on behalf of Philip Morris and RJ
Reynolds) tells the Standing Committee that Plain Packaging would be an infringement
of  GATT,  NAFTA  and  the  Paris  Convention.”45 The plain packaging initiative in Canada
ultimately failed in 1995 when the Supreme Court of Canada invalidated the Canadian
Tobacco Products Control Act. It is widely believed that RJR’s   NAFTA suit threat
deterred the Canadian government from instituting plain packaging before the Court
ruling.46

Similarly, Phillip Morris engaged in a campaign to oppose the attempt of Canada's
government to regulate the wording of cigarette marketing. In 2001, the Government of
Canada proposed a regulation to "prohibit the display of 'light' and 'mild' descriptors on
tobacco packaging.”47 Phillip Morris International Inc. protested the ban on the basis of

45

Physicians for Smoke-Free   Canada   “The   Plot   Against   Plain   Packaging   How   multinational   tobacco  
companies colluded to use trade arguments they knew were phoney to oppose plain packaging. And how
health   ministers   in   Canada   and   Australia   fell   for   their   chicanery.” (2008), http://www.smokefree.ca/pdf_1/plotagainstplainpackaging-apr1'.pdf
46
http://jurist.org/forum/2011/12/allyn-taylor-tobacco-suit.php
47
See Tobacco.org, Philip Morris Submission to Canada on NAFTA 's Chapter 11 Provision,
http://www.tobacco.org/Documents/0203pmnafta.html). See also Alberto Salazar V., “NAFTA  Chapter  11,  
Regulatory Expropriation and Domestic Counter-Advertising   Law”   (2010)   27   Arizona   Journal   of  
International and Comparative Law 31 at 69-70.

18

Chapter 11 arguing that, "the ban would be tantamount to an expropriation of tobacco
trademarks containing descriptive terms.”48 The proposed regulation was never fully
developed. The threat of a NAFTA Chapter 11 lawsuit convinced Canada to back down
from instituting plain packaging with health warnings for cigarettes.49

The debate over plain packaging of cigarettes has gained momentum in Canada with the
recent  decision  of  Australia’s  Supreme  Court  to  uphold  such  legislation  which  has  come  
into force on December 1, 2012.50 Plain packaging legislation will bar tobacco companies
from displaying their brand designs, colours and logos on cigarette packs which will
instead feature bigger health warnings and strong anti-smoking images. In Canada, the
tobacco industry and anti-smoking groups have reinvigorated their opposite views. For
example, the Canadian Cancer Society, the Non-Smokers' Rights Association and
Physicians for a Smoke-Free Canada are urging the adoption of plain packaging laws
48

Id. See also Donald W. Zeigler, International Trade Agreements Challenge Tobacco and Alcohol
Control Policies, 25 DRUG & ALCOHOL REV. 567, 568 (2006) (explaining that "Philip Morris used [a
technical barrier to trade] argument[] to contest a Canadian ban on use of the terms 'mild' and 'light' in
cigarette promotion, because the corporation said that a ban was not the least trade restrictive alternative to
reduce tobacco-related problems.").
49
See Physicians for Smoke-Free   Canada  “The  Plot  Against  Plain  Packaging  How   multinational  tobacco  
companies colluded to use trade arguments they knew were phoney to oppose plain packaging. And how
health   ministers   in   Canada   and   Australia   fell   for   their   chicanery.”   (2008),   http://www.smokefree.ca/pdf_1/plotagainstplainpackaging-apr1'.pdf
“2002:  Canadian  proposals  to  ban  ‘light’  descriptors
Philip Morris filed a notice claiming that any bans on trademarks would be an expropriation, inconsistent
with Chapter 11 of NAFTA, saying that they had "invested substantial sums to develop brand identity and
consumer loyalty  for  these  low  yield  products.”  Canada  has  yet  to  impose  regulations  banning  these  terms,  
although  a  voluntary  agreement  was  reached  with  Philip  Morris’  subsidiary  and  other  tobacco  companies.”  
See also ROBERT WEISSMAN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND TOBACCO
CONTROL: THREATS TO PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE CASE FOR EXCLUDING TOBACCO FROM
TRADE AGREEMENTS (2003); E.R. Shaffer, J.E. Brenner & T.P. Houston, International Trade
Agreements: A Threat to Tobacco Control Policy, 14 TOBACCO CONTROL (SUPPLEMENT II) iil9, ii22
(2005); Ellen Gould, Trade Treaties and Alcohol Advertising Policy, 26 J. PUB. HEALTH POL'Y 359
(2005); Interview by Runako Kumbula with Cynthia Callard, Executive Director, Physicians for a Smoke
Free Canada (Apr. 1, 2002).
50
“Cigarette plain packaging laws come into force in Australia. Smoking warnings and diseased body parts
emblazoned   on   dull   green   boxes   that   are   the   same   for   all   tobacco   brands”   The Guardian (Saturday 1
December 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/dec/01/plain-packaging-australian-cigarettetobacco.
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following   Australia’s   precedent.51 On the other hand, Imperial Tobacco Canada, a
subsidiary of British American Tobacco and one of the companies that has challenged the
Australian legislation, has questioned the effectiveness of plain packaging of tobacco
products in discouraging youth initiation or encouraging cessation by existing smokers.52
This debate is expected to grow and NAFTA arguments against plain packaging
legislation will probably be a central part of that debate. Indeed, trade objections to such
legislation have recently been raised by Philip  Morris  Asia  that  is  challenging  Australia’s  
plain packaging legislation under the 1993 bilateral investment treaty between Australia
and Hong Kong.

While the tobacco industry is actively influencing the meaning and use of NAFTA
Chapter 11 and appears to have succeeded in deterring plain packaging legislation, antismoking groups and other public interest groups are not necessarily in the same position
to exert such degree of influence. Such groups often lack the financial resources and

51

“Canadian anti-smoking advocates urge plain packaging laws. Tobacco companies say current labelling
laws infringe on rights”  CBC News (August 15, 2012),
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ability to launch massive campaigns and lobby governments for further intervention to
reduce tobacco consumption.

That problem has recently become more evident with the decision of the government of
Canada to cut funding for anti-smoking groups. The Non-Smokers' Rights Association,
for example, is taking a 40 per cent hit to its budget because of the cuts to the grants
program.53 Health groups and tobacco control advocates are of course appalled. Garfield
Mahood, founding executive director of the Non-Smokers’  Rights  Association, has raised
concerns about the impact of such decision indicating that the only winner is really Big
Tobacco. 54 “By  slashing  funding  to  health  groups,  the  Harper  government  has  virtually  
assured that tobacco companies will have the upper hand in influencing federal policy
decisions.”

55

The funding grants to anti-smoking   groups   have   “helped   counter   the  

influence   of   tobacco   companies   and   their   lobbying   efforts   …   and   have   helped   with   the  
research  behind  successful  campaigns  and  policy  initiatives.”56

What is most concerning is that these funding cuts may undermine anti-smoking groups
that seek to represent vulnerable groups with high tobacco consumption rates. For
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News, Apr 17, 2012), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa/story/2012/04/17/pol-0tobacco-cuts.html
54
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instance, smoking rates are out of control among aboriginal populations. “Tobaccorelated illnesses and diseases are urgent issues in First Nations and Inuit communities,
where   smoking   rates   are   more   than   triple   the   rate   for   the   rest   of   Canada”.57 Similar
concerns are expressed for other groups with high prevalence of tobacco consumption
such as youth, ethnic minorities and low income people.58 This should not be surprising
because “smoking is now clearly associated with disadvantage and inequity.”59 Although
approximately 20% of the Canadian population smokes, certain subpopulations have
higher prevalence, including Aboriginals, low-income people, and homeless people.60
Recent estimates indicate that the smoking rate in Canada's aboriginal population is close
to 50 per cent.61 Despite the general funding cuts to health groups, it is reported that there
will still be $7 million in this year's $38-million budget for grants and contributions to
health groups, but the government intends to direct that money mostly to aboriginal
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groups,62 which reportedly will be the new focus of the anti-smoking program.63 It is
important to remember, however, that in 2006 the government “suspended”  $10  million  
in annual funding for the First Nations and Inuit Tobacco Control Strategy.64

Groups with high prevalence of tobacco consumption may need organized representation
and engage in advocacy to promote favorable tobacco control policies. Yet, they have
also been financially weakened by funding cuts for anti-smoking groups. Moreover,
recent general funding cuts are further weakening the ability of such groups to advocate,
inter alia, tobacco policies that meet their needs. For instance, the government is
drastically  reducing  general  funding  for  aboriginal  communities.  “The core funding of the
Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations will be cut to $500,000 per year from the
current $1.6 million by 2013-14. Tribal councils will face cuts of 20 to 40 per cent. The
Metis Nation – Saskatchewan …  is also being cut.”65 First Nations in Northern Ontario
are currently preparing for looming federal funding cuts and caps that could slash their
budgets in half.66 First Nations leaders believe that such funding cuts seek to weaken
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their capacity to deal with environmental assessments, companies and business
agreements. 67

The interest and voice of groups with high rates of tobacco consumption are thus likely to
be both underrepresented in tobacco policy-making and debilitated for defending a
favorable policy from NAFTA challenges. In such a context, it will be easier for
governments to continue neglecting the needs of such groups and for the tobacco industry
to expand their influence on NAFTA-based tobacco policies and their market share
associated with such groups. Indeed, for example, tobacco advertising received via US
media sources increasingly targets vulnerable groups such as youth, women,
ethnocultural groups and gays and lesbians.68

Thus, public interest groups such as anti-smoking groups are not only financially and
politically disadvantaged, but also their current legal rights to participate as amicus
curiae in NAFTA arbitrations are severely limited. This in practice censors their views
and influence that in turn worsens the public accountability of NAFTA arbitration and
further empowers the views of foreign investors to the detriment of the public interest. It
is then difficult to expect a significant improvement in the balancing of foreign  investors’  
interest and public policy and, more generally, in the democratic nature of policy-making.
Given the erosion of the financial basis of public interest groups and the modest rights of
67
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non-disputing parties, amici curiae is of little help for such groups and rather play the
symbolic  role  of  legitimizing  the  predominance  of  trade  and  foreign  investors’  interest  by  
giving the appearance of public accountability.

While expansive amici curiae appear to be important for anti-smoking groups in the
context of defending a policy from NAFTA challenges before, during or after an
arbitration, the economic and political conditions for public interest groups to participate
in NAFTA disputes should not be underestimated. Indeed, an amicus curiae institution
may provide broader participation rights, but the lack of financial or political resources
may prevent civil society groups to effectively participate in NAFTA disputes as amicus
curiae. A defragmentation project seeking to protect local citizen-consumers via amici
curiae thus requires not only a facilitative legal framework but also financially and
politically strong public interest groups capable of advocating the public interest in the
face of influential corporate discourses. Moreover, considerations should be given to the
need to develop a duty of governments and foreign investors to not interfere with the
growth of relevant public interest groups that are likely to participate as non-disputing
parties in NAFTA Chapter 11 disputes. This might include the government’s  obligation  
to provide basic funding for public interest groups working in the area of, for example,
public health.

CONCLUSION
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Concerns about the inconsistency and unpredictability associated with the application of
NAFTA Chapter 11 and the difficulties  in  balancing  foreign  investors’  interest  and  public  
policy are common and unresolved. The institutional environment suggests that interest
groups also play a role in the social construction of the meaning and use of NAFTA
Chapter 11 through arbitration and public debate. This work discusses the extent to which
amici curiae empower public interest groups such as citizen-consumer groups. It argued
that currently amici curiae provide an extremely narrow list of participation rights to
public interest groups that, coupled with economic and political disadvantages in many
cases, result in both censoring the views of such groups and playing the political role of
symbolic accountability. This work proposes an expansive view of amici curiae for
public interest groups in light of the potential of the latter to counter the influence of
corporate interest groups and to contribute to both minimize the NAFTA Chapter 11
inconsistencies and strike a more realistic balance between the public interest and foreign
investors’  interest.   Ultimately, such a view of amici curiae is likely to help defragment
NAFTA Chapter 11 as public interest groups will be in a stronger position to introduce
considerations   other   than   trade   and   foreign   investors’   economic   interest provided
favorable financial and political conditions. A brief discussion of amici curiae in the
context of anti-smoking groups in Canada provided a good example of the potential and
limits of an expansive view of amici curiae. Further investigation is needed to establish
more precisely the extent to which public interest groups can influence NAFTA Chapter
11 arbitration decisions under an expansive regime of amici curiae.

26

